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I. U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)
A. RATIFICATION EFFORTS
The United States moved no closer to ratifying the U.N. Convention on the Law of the
Sea (UNCLOS or Convention) in 2006.1 Accession last looked probable in 2004 when
the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee (Committee) voted unanimously to support
accession and ratification of the Convention. 2 Despite wide-ranging support across both
the public and private sectors at that time, the Convention was not brought to a full
Senate vote before the 108th Congress adjourned. As a result, the Convention again re-
quires consideration by the Committee before it can be resubmitted to the Senate for a
full vote. It remains to be seen whether the change in congressional leadership in Novem-
ber 2006 will lead to new hearings on the Convention. Nonetheless, the number of par-
ties to UNCLOS continues to grow. In 2006, three additional states-Belarus,
Montenegro, and Niue-acceded to the Convention, bringing the total number of states
parties to 152. 3
* Co-Chair, Law of the Sea Committee. The law of the sea is fascinating precisely because it interacts
with numerous other areas of substantive law, including international security, environmental law, human
rights, trade, and international development. This contribution highlights several significant developments
that marked the law of the sea in 2006, but makes no claim to comprehensiveness. For another useful over-
view, see The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on Oceans and the Law of the Sea, delivered to the
General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/61/63/Add.l (Aug. 17, 2006), http:J/www.un.org/Depts/los/general assem-
bly/general-assembly-reports.htm.
I. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter
UNCLOSI.
2. See John A. Duff, The United States and the Law of the Sea Convention: Sliding Back from Accession and
Ratification, 11 OCEAN & COAsrAL L. J. 1, 2 (2005/06).
3. See Oceans and Law of the Sea, Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, Agreement for the
Implementation of the Provisions of the Convention relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish
Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, May 12, 2006, http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention-agreements/
convention agreements.hon.
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B. RATIFICATION AND LMPLEMENTATION OF UNCLOS RELATED AGREEMENTS
Belarus, Montenegro, and Niue, as well as Vietnam, also ratified the Agreement Relat-
ing to the Implementation of Part XI of the Convention (Part XI Agreement), which deals
with exploitation and management of the deep seabed.4 One hundred and twenty-six
countries have now joined the Part XI Agreement.5 In addition, Poland, Slovakia, Esto-
nia, Japan, Trinidad and Tobago, and Niue acceded to the Agreement for the Implementa-
tion of the Provisions of the Convention Relating to the Conservation and Management
of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks (UNFSA), which now has
sixty-two states as parties. 6 Marking the fourth anniversary of UNFSA's entry into force,
a review conference was held in May 2006 to assess implementation efforts. 7 Conference
observers noted that participants, which included both parties and nonparties to UNFSA,
appeared to treat UNFSA principles as the settled "rules of the game." s Many nonparty
participants "framed their interventions in UNFSA language, and were keen to note their
ongoing compliance," even without expressing any immediate intention to accede to the
agreement.9 Participants were generally critical of the insufficient progress made by re-
gional fisheries management organizations, which are the primary organs charged with
promotion of long-term fish stock sustainability through inspection and enforcementO
The final report generated by the conference included strong calls for reducing global
fishing capacity, eliminating subsidies, and enforcing flag state control over support and
fishing vessels. Despite consensus on many issues, the inspection and boarding of fishing
vessels remained contentious. I
C. U.N. COMMISSION ON LIIrrs OF THE CONTINENTAL SHELF
Article 75 of UNCLOS defines the continental shelf and sets forth the procedures for
determination of its outer limit, where the shelf extends more than 200 nautical miles
from the coastal state. 12 The U.N. Commission on Limits of the Continental Shelf
(Commission) was established pursuant to Annex HI of UNCLOS and acts as "[t]he police-
man who oversees the application of Article 76." 13 Not only does the Commission con-
sider applications from coastal states asserting shelf claims in excess of the 200 nautical
4. Agreement Relating to the Implementation of Part XI of the United Nations Convention on the Law
of the Sea of 10 December 1982, July 28, 1994, 1836 U.N.T.S. 42.
5. See UN, Agreement Relating to the Implementation of Part XI of tbe United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea of 10 December 1982, July 28, 1994, http:/untreaty.un.org/ENGLISH/bible/englishinternetbible/
partl/chapterXXI/treaty7.asp.
6. Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea of 10 December 1982 Relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and
Highlymigratory Fish Stock, Aug. 4, 1995, 2167 U.N.T.S. 88 [hereinafter UNFSA].
7. The Review Conference was held pursuant to UNFSA, supra note 6, art. 36 and G.A. Res. 59/25, 1 16,
U.N. Doc. A/RES/59/25 (Jan. 17, 2005).
8. See Nienke Beintema, et al., Summary of the UN Fish Stocks Agreement Review Conference: 22-26 May




12. UNCLOS, supra note 1, at art. 76. See also David A. Colson, The Delimitation of the Outer Continental
Shelf Between Neighboring States, 97 AM. J. INr'L L. 91 (2003).
13. Colson, supra note 12, at 93.
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mile limit, but the Commission also is available to provide scientific and technical advice
on request.' 4 States must submit those applications within ten years of the Convention's
entry into force for that state. During 2006, the Commission made progress on three
pending submissions from Brazil, Australia, and Ireland; final recommendations are antici-
pated in 2007.15 New Zealand submitted a new application in 2006, as did France, Ire-
land, Spain, and the United Kingdom, which made the first joint submission.' 6
I. International Security
On October 14, 2006, the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 1718 in response
to North Korea's test of a nuclear weapon on October 9, 2006.17 Acting pursuant to
Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, the Security Council condemned the
test and established a set of targeted sanctions."' The restrictions prohibit the import or
transfer to North Korea of large-scale arms, technology and training relating to ballistic
missiles or to weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and luxury goods.' 9 Furthermore,
the Security Council directed all Member States "to take, in accordance with their na-
tional authorities and legislation, and consistent with international law, cooperative action
including through inspection of cargo to and from [North Korea], as necessary." 20 Specif-
ically, Member States must "prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer to
[North Korea], through their territories or by their nationals, or using their flag vessels or
aircraft" of materials that could contribute to North Korea's nuclear weapons program. 2 1
The resolution also bans the export of all such materials and directs Member States to
"prohibit the procurement of such items from [North Korea] by their nationals, or using
their flagged vessels or aircraft."22
Because the Security Council invoked Chapter VII, the provisions of Resolution 1718
are legally binding.2 3 However, the resolution fails to provide as much legal authority to
enforce the sanctions regime as some states, particularly the United States, had sought.
Because it "explicitly only allows the inspection of cargo through and from [North Korea]
in conformity with international law," the resolution likely cannot be interpreted "to justify
boarding of foreign vessels on the high seas to inspect for contraband, without prior con-
sent of the flag state." 24 Despite efforts by the United States to obtain a resolution that
would have authorized high seas interdictions without prior flag state consent-an author-
ization that would supersede the protections provided to vessels navigating the high seas
14. UNCLOS, supra note 1, Annex I1, art. 3.
15. The Chairman of the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, Statement by the Chairman of
the Commission on the Linits of the Continental Shelf on the progress of work in the Commission, U.N. Doc. CLCS/
52 (Oct. 6, 2006).
16. Id.
17. S.C. Res. 1718, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1718 (Oct. 14, 2006).
18. Id. TT 1, 8.
19. Id. 8. See also Andreas L. Paulus & J6rn MOller, ASIL Insight, Security Council Resolution 1718 on
North Korea's Nuclear Test, Nov. 3, 2006, http://www.asil.org/insights/2006/1 l/insights06ll03.htnl.
20. S.C. Res. 1718, supra note 17, 8(0.
21. Id. I 8(a).
22. Id. I 8(b).
23. See Paulus & Maller, supra note 19. The two previous resolutions on North Korea did not draw upon
Chapter VII.
24. Id. (emphasis added).
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by both Article 110 of UNCLOS and customary international law-those efforts were
apparently blocked by China, which expressed reservations about even "the limited provi-
sion that was adopted as a compromise."
25
On November 13, 2006, the United States reported its implementation efforts to the
Security Council. The report noted that the United States "works with like-minded
countries, including through [the Proliferation Security Initiative]to prevent the transfers
to or from North Korea" of the type prohibited by Paragraph 8 of the resolution.2 6 First
announced in May 2003 by President George W. Bush, the Proliferation Security Initia-
tive (PSI) facilitates cooperation among a loose coalition of states with the goal of
"preventing and disrupting shipments of weapons of mass destruction ...and related
materials [from] flowing to or from states or non-State actors of proliferation concern." 27
PSI participants pledge to pool their intelligence and physical resources to interdict ves-
sels at sea that pose threats and, where necessary, to seize the vessel and its cargo. 28 The
PSI has steadily gained international support over the past three years. In late 2006, the
U.S. State Department reported that eighty countries were PSI "participants."2 9 That
said, it remains somewhat unclear what it means to be a PSI "participant" given that the
"requirements for support appear to be fairly weak."30 In addition, several key states re-
main absent from the participant list, including China, India, and Indonesia. Nonetheless,
PSI participants reportedly collaborated between April 2005 and April 2006 "on roughly
two dozen separate occasions to prevent transfers of equipment and materials to VMD
and missile programs in countries of concern," such as Iran. 31 Although PSI rhetoric
25. Id. UNCLOS Article 87 codifies the freedom of the high seas, including the freedom of navigation.
Article 110 sets forth the rules governing right of visit. Generally, ships on the high seas may only be visited
for inspection in highly limited circumstances, such as where the ship is engaged in piracy, the slave trade,
unauthorized broadcasting, or is not registered with any state. Furthermore, Articles 95 and 96 provide
complete immunity to warships on the high seas, as well as ships engaged in government noncommercial
service. For that reason, North Korean warships are unaffected by the inspection mandate of Resolution
1718.
26. Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation, U.S. State Department, United States 30-Day
Report for the UN Security Council on Efforts Toward Implementing UNSCR 1718 (Nov. 13, 2006), http://www.
state.gov/t/isn/76138.htn [hereinafter U.S. REPORT ON RES. 1718].
27. Id. The initial PSI partners agreed to a Statement of Interdiction Principles in September 2003. See
Office of Press Secretary, U.S. State Department, Proliferation Security Initiative: Statement ofInterdiction Prin-
ciples, http://www.state.gov/t/isn/rls/fs/23764.htm. For critical overviews of the PSI, see Michael A. Becker,
The Shifting Public Order of the Oceans: Freedom of Navigation and the Interdiction of Ships at Sea, 46 HARV. INT'L
L.J. 131 (2005); Michael Byers, Policing the High Seas: The Proliferation Security Initiative, 98 Am. J. INT'L L.
526 (2004).
28. Becker, supra note 27, at 134.
29. See Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation, U.S. State Department, Proliferation Security
Initiative Participants (Nov. 28, 2006), http://www.state.gov/t/isn/cl9310.htm.
30. SHARON SQUASsOm, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS: PROLIFERATION SECURITY INITIATIVE (PSI)
(Sept. 14, 2006), http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/48624.pdf.
31. Robert G. Joseph, Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security, Broadening and Deep-
ening Our Proliferation Security Initiative Cooperation, June 23, 2006, http:www.state.gov/t/us/rm/68269.htm.
In addition, the PSI has continued to conduct interdiction training exercises. In October 2006, over twenty-
five states took part in Operation Leading Edge, the first PSI training event held in the Persian Gulf. See
Office of the Spokesman, U.S. State Department, United States Hosts Proliferation Security Initiative Interdiction
Exercise (Oct. 27, 2006), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2006/75274.htm. This marked the third maritime
interdiction exercise held in 2006. See Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation, U.S. State
Department, PSI Calendar of Events, http://www.state.gov/t/isn/c12684.htm.
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initially suggested that the initiative might encourage states to circumvent the traditional
freedom of navigation on the high seas, the PSI, in practice, has primarily utilized existing
national and international legal authorities to promote its mission.
The U.S. Report to the United Nations on the implementation of Resolution 1718 is
consistent with that impression. The report emphasizes that U.S. actions with respect to
North Korea-including those actions taken under the auspices of the PSI-"are not in-
tended to implement a blockade or embargo on North Korea." 32 Making no mention of
interdictions on the high seas, the report states that "inspections will take place in territo-
rial waters, ports, airfields, and other border crossings and generally be conducted by
state-sanctioned local officials such as customs authorities, coast guards, and navies." 33
The report also points out that the recently approved Protocol to the Convention for the
Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, which requires
states to criminalize under domestic law the transport of WVMDs or related materials, will
enhance PSI capabilities and the ability of U.N. Member States to implement Resolution
1718. 34 The Protocol was opened for signature on February 14, 2006; the United States
has signed but not ratified the agreement.
Beyond the United States, the response to Resolution 1718 has varied. Japan immedi-
ately seized upon the resolution to impose a ban on all exports of luxury goods to North
Korea and banned all North Korean vessels from Japanese ports.35 France conducted the
first inspection of a North Korean vessel explicitly in response to the U.N. mandate; the
search of the vessel in the Mayotte port of Longoni did not uncover any contraband.36
Four other North Korean vessels were reportedly searched during the first month after
passage of Resolution 1718, but none were explicitly searched in response to the resolu-
tion-and no materials prohibited by the U.N. action were discovered.37 Crucially, how-
ever, South Korea has refused to participate in the inspection regime and has turned down
American requests for assistance. 38 Citing the need to maintain economic leverage in the
six-party talks aimed at reaching a disarmament agreement, South Korea asserted that it
does enough to comply with the U.N. requirements by carefully screening trade under
various other nonproliferation agreements. 39
32. U.S. REPORT ON RES. 1718, sufpra note 26.
33. Id.
34. Id. See also Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Naviga-
tion, Mar. 10, 1988, 1678 U.N.T.S. 221.
35. Choe Sang-Hun, Seoul Refuses to Help U.S. Intercept N. Korean Ships, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13, 2006, availa-
ble at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/11/13/world/asia/13cnd-korea.html?ex=1321074000&en=c632a3e2ffb5
371 a&ei=5088&partner=rssnyt&emc=rss.
36. John Leicester, France Inspecting North Korean Ship, ASSOCiATED PRESS, Nov. 16, 2006, http://abcnews.
go.com/nternational/wireStoryid=2658867&CMP=OTC-RSSFeeds0312.
37. Id. Hong Kong officials inspected two vessels, while officials in India and Myanmar also each detained
a North Korean vessel.
38. See Choe Sang-Hun, supra note 35.
39. Id.
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Ill. New International Agreements
A. PIiAcv
The International Maritime Bureau of the International Chamber of Commerce (IMB)
reported that piracy attacks were on the decline in 2006.40 Through the first nine months
of 2006, 174 attacks were reported, down from 205 over the same period in 2005. None-
theless, the report noted that "piracy continues to plague hotspots such as Bangladesh and
Nigeria," and "Indonesia still accounted for more attacks than any other country."'41 Re-
gional coordination has played a critical role in reducing piracy. On September 4, 2006,
the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy (RECAAP) and Armed Rob-
bery Against Ships in Asia entered into force. 42 In addition to providing that all parties
"take effective measures to prevent piracy and armed robbery against ships and to arrest
pirates," RECAAP provides for creation of an "Information Sharing Center" in Singa-
pore.43 Parties to the agreement may request cooperation from other parties directly or
through the center.44 In Africa, delegates from more than forty states agreed in June 2006
to equip their flag vessels with an Automated Identification System "to address security
and resource exploitation issues." 45 Delegates also agreed to develop naval task forces in
various zones surrounding the continent to enhance patrol capabilities aimed at reducing
piracy and oil theft.
B. WORKING CONDIIONS AT SEA
The International Labour Organization (ILO) adopted a new Maritime Labour Con-
vention on February 23, 2006.4 6 The Labour Convention contains a seafarers' "bill of
rights," but attempts to leave individual countries with sufficient flexibility "to deliver
those rights with transparency and accountability." 4 7 Specifically, the Labour Convention
establishes minimum standards for conditions of employment, hours of work and rest,
accommodation, medical care, and social security protection.4 8 Flag states are responsible
40. ICC Commercial Crime Services, Global Piracy Decreasing But Hotspots Remain Deadly, Oct. 31, 2006,
http://www.icc-ccs.org/main/news.php?newsid=76.
41. Id.
42. National University of Singapore, Centre for Maritime Studies Newsletter fJuly 2006), http://www.mari-
timestudies.nus.edu.sg/newsletter-july2006subject.htn [hereinafter Maritime Newsletter]. The Agreement
is available at http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/kaiyo/pdfs/kyotei-s.pdf.
43. Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy (RECAAP) and Armed Robbery Against Ships
in Asia, art. 3 & pt. H1.
44. Id. at pt. lU.
45. Maritime Newsletter, spra note 42.
46. Maritime Labour Convention, 2006, available at http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/convdispl.htm.
47. Press Release, International Labour Organization, ILO Adopts Sweeping New Charter for Maritime
Sector: New Convention Will Guarantee "Quality Shipping" Worldwide (Feb. 23, 2006), available at http:/
www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/inf/pr/2006/7.htm.
48. The Convention comprises three different but related parts: the Articles, the Regulations, and the
Code. The Articles and Regulations set out the core rights and principles and the basic obligations of Mem-
bers ratifying the Convention. The Code contains the details for the implementation of the Regulations. It
comprises Part A (mandatory Standards) and Part B (non-mandatory Guidelines). The Regulations and the
Code are organized into general areas under five Titles: Title 1, Minimum requirements for seafarers to work
on a ship; Title 2, Conditions of employment; Title 3, Accommodation, recreational facilities, food and ca-
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for verification of the implementation of those standards.49 In addition, the Labour Con-
vention contains "accelerated amendment procedures" that are designed to allow updates
to its technical provisions. 50 It will come into force after ratification by thirty ILO Mem-
ber States with a total share of at least 30 percent of world gross tonnage.5' Proponents
see the Labour Convention as the "fourth pillar" of the international maritime regulatory
regime, along with three other prominent International Maritime Organization agree-
ments: the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea; the Standards of Train-
ing, Certification, and Watchkeeping Convention; and the International Convention for
the Prevention of Pollution from Ships.5 2
IV. International Disputes
A. COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES V. IRELAND (THE MOX PLANT
CASE)
On May 30, 2006, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) held that Ireland violated the
Treaty Establishing the European Community (EC Treaty) when it instituted proceedings
against the United Kingdom before an arbitral tribunal pursuant to the dispute resolution
provisions of UNCLOS. 53 The dispute arose out of the construction and operation of a
MOX plant in the United Kingdom by British Nuclear Fuel plc.5 4 A MOX plant recycles
plutonium from spent nuclear fuel to produce mixed oxide fuel, which serves as an energy
source for nuclear power stations. On October 25, 2001, Ireland instituted proceedings
before an arbitral tribunal pursuant to UNCLOS Article 287 and Annex VII to resolve
"the dispute concerning the MOX plant, international movements of radioactive materials
and the protection of the marine environment of the Irish Sea."55 Specifically, Ireland
claimed that the United Kingdom granted regulatory approval to the MOX plant even
though UNCLOS requirements had not been satisfied during the consultation phase.56
In addition, Ireland submitted a request for provisional measures to the International Tri-
bunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS), seeking to compel the United Kingdom to suspend
the plant's operation while the case was pending.57 On December 3, 2001, ITLOS pre-
scribed a set of interim measures that essentially required that Ireland and the United
Kingdom cooperate to monitor the pollution risks associated with the plant.58
In the course of proceedings, the arbitral tribunal determined that, in light of jurisdic-
tional objections raised by the United Kingdom and in the interest of comity between
tering; Title 4, Health protection, medical care, welfare and social security protection; and Tide 5, Compli-
ance and enforcement.
49. Id. at art. V.
50. Id. at art. XIV.
51. Id. at art. VIII.
52. Id.
53. Case C-459/03, European Commission v. Ireland, 2006 E.C.R. 1-04635 [hereinafter MOX Plant
Dispute].
54. Id. 20.
55. Id. 1 34.
56. Id. 87, 89.
57. ld. 1 38.
58. ITLOS Case No. 10, The MOX Plant Case (Ireland v. U.K.), Provisional Measures (Dec. 3, 2001),
http://www.itlos.org/start2-en.htrnl; MOX Plant Dispute, 1 89.
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judicial institutions, it was necessary to suspend the proceedings until the ECJ could de-
cide whether it possessed exclusive jurisdiction over the dispute.59 In the ECJ proceed-
ings, the European Commission asserted that Ireland had "failed to respect the exclusive
jurisdiction of the [ECJ] in regard to disputes concerning the interpretation and applica-
tion of Community law." 60 Specifically, the provisions relied upon by Ireland in its claim
against the United Kingdom allegedly came "within the scope of the Community's exter-
nal competence in matters relating to environmental protection" pursuant to Articles 175
and 292 of the EC Treaty.61 Ireland responded that the relevant UNCLOS provisions
involved "stricter obligations than those provided for under Community law," and that no
Community legislation existed with respect to "the discharge of radioactive substances
into the marine environment." 62 For that reason, Ireland claimed, the ECJ did not pos-
sess exclusive jurisdiction over the dispute.
In its decision, the ECJ found that because the European Community is a signatory to
UNCLOS, "the provisions of that convention now form an integral part of the Commu-
nity legal order."63 Furthermore, the European Community had stipulated at the time it
acceded to UNCLOS that it had exclusive competence with regard to the prevention of
marine pollution to the extent to which those provisions affect existing Community rules.
In addition, pursuant to Article 292 of the EC Treaty, "Member States undertake not to
submit a dispute concerning the interpretation or application of the EC Treaty to any
method of settlement other than those provided for therein."64
In particular, the ECJ noted that Directives 85/337, 90/313, and 93/75, all of which
concern the regulation of marine pollution, demonstrated that Community competence
extended to the type of matters at issue in the MOX Plant dispute; marine pollution was
an area of shared competence that had been transferred to the Community, even if specific
rules did not yet exist with respect to all areas of marine pollution. Because the specific
UNCLOS provisions relevant to the MOX Plant dispute were found, therefore, to be
within the scope of Community competence, Ireland violated Article 292 by instituting
the ITLOS proceedings. 65 The ECJ rejected Ireland's further contention that it would be
inconsistent to find that UNCLOS provisions were part of Community law without also
finding that the UNCLOS dispute resolution procedures had been integrated as well.
The ECJ wrote that "an international agreement such as [UNCLOS] cannot affect the
exclusive jurisdiction of the [ECJ] in regard to the resolution of disputes between Member
States concerning the interpretation and application of Community law." 66 As the ECJ
correctly pointed out, furthermore, the situation is addressed by UNCLOS Article 282:
Dispute resolution procedures agreed to between parties to a regional agreement "shall
apply in lieu" of the procedures set forth by UNCLOS.67
59. MOX Plant Dispute, supra note 47, 91 42-46.
60. Id. T 60.
61. Id. 1 61.
62. Id. 9191 72-73.
63. Id. 1 82.
64. Id. 1 123.
65. Id. 99 126-29.
66. Id. 9 130-32.
67. Id. 9 132; UNCLOS, supra note 1, art. 282.
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European Community v. Ireland provides useful guidance regarding the interaction of
European law and the dispute resolution procedures of international agreements to which
Member States of the European Union (EU) may be parties. However, the decision poses
some risk of "fragmentation" in the adjudication of cases arising pursuant to UNCLOS.
If maritime disputes between EU members may only be decided by the ECJ-rather than
by ITLOS or the International Court of Justice (ICJ)-UNCLOS provisions may be in-
terpreted and applied inconsistently. Alternatively, this provides a valuable opportunity
for international tribunals to demonstrate that they can-and do-listen to their fellow
judicial bodies. It bears watching whether the ECJ will draw upon the relevant jurispru-
dence of ITLOS and the ICJ in future disputes between Member States that implicate the
law of the sea.
B. AUSTRALIA AND TIMOR-LESTE MARITIME BOUNDARY DISPUTE
The governments of Australia and Timor-Leste took another step in 2006 towards
resolving the long-running dispute over control of the undersea oil and gas fields that lie
between them in the Timor Sea. On January 12, 2006, the two countries signed the
Treaty on Certain Maritime Arrangements in the Timor Sea (CMATS Treaty), which
allocates oil and gas revenues from the disputed areas. 68 The CMATS Treaty comes on
the heels of previous agreements reached in 2002 and 2003 that defined a Joint Petroleum
Development Area CPDA) and the terms of its exploitation; Timor-Leste has rights to 90
percent of the revenue from the JPDA.69 Under the CMATS Treaty, however, Australia
maintains complete control over the 80 percent of the Greater Sunrise oil and gas field
that lies beyond the JPDA. Timor-Leste had previously asserted that redrawing the mari-
time boundaries in accordance with international principles would place 80 percent of that
field under Timor-Leste's control. The CMATS Treaty does not provide formal resolu-
tion to the underlying maritime boundary dispute; instead, the countries agreed that
neither will pursue a maritime boundary claim against the other for a period of fifty
years. 70 "This enables international companies to proceed with petroleum projects ... but
does not resolve the essential question of maritime boundaries." 71 It also means that most
of the gas and oil deposits may be exhausted by the time the moratorium expires. 72
C. RENEWED TENSIONS SURROUNDING THE NORTHWEST PASSAGE
Questions surrounding control of the Northwest Passage resurfaced in 2006.7 3 The
Northwest Passage consists of a series of straits and channels connecting the Atlantic and
68. Treaty on Certain Maritime Arrangements in the Timor Sea, Austr.-Timor-Leste, Jan. 12, 2006, availa-
ble at http://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/east.timor/treaty_120113.pdf.
69. Michael White & Craig Forrest, Australian Maritime Law Update: 2005, 37 J. MAR. L. & COM. 299,
305 (uly 2006).
70. Id.
71. The CMATS Treaty, TiE LA'O HAMsrUK BULLETIN (La'o Hamutuk, The Timor-Leste Institute for
Reconstruction Monitoring and Analysis, Dili, Timor-Leste), Apr. 2006, at 1, available at http://www.
laohamutuk.org/Bulletin/2006/Apr/LHBv7n lenS.pdf.
72. White & Forrest, supra note 62, at 305 n.26.
73. For background on this dispute, particularly with regard to pollution controls and extension of the
Exclusive Economic Zone over the Northwest Passage, see Candace L. Bates, Comment, U.S. Ratification of
the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea: Passive Acceptance Is Not Enough to Protect U.S. Property Interests, 31
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the Pacific Oceans through Arctic waters. Historically, ice has prevented regular shipping
through the passage, but observers have noted that global warming trends may open up
the waterway to year-round surface shipping in the near future.7a Canada controls the
islands that dot the Arctic to the north of Canada's mainland and claims the Northwest
Passage as an internal waterway over which it could deny passage to other ships. The
United States classifies the waterway as an international strait.75 U.S. officials claim to be
acting in accordance with the "long-standing position in favor of keeping straits free to all
navigation." 76 However, Canada has long asserted that it has sole jurisdiction over the
waterway and should be able to enforce its own laws on ships in the Arctic waters. During
his 2006 election campaign, Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper announced that he
would seek "to increase Canada's military presence in the Arctic" by deploying three mili-
tary icebreakers as a remote sensing network. "Sovereignty is something, you use it or
lose it," Harper said. 77 It remains to be seen whether claims over access to the Northwest
Passage will escalate into an international conflict in need of dispute resolution.
V. The Law of the Sea in U.S. Federal Courts
A. SARAI v. Rio Tnz-ro
In Sarai v. Rio Tinto, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the district
court erred by dismissing all of plaintiffs' human rights claims against Rio Tinto, a
London-based international mining company with operations in Papua New Guinea
(PNG), "as presenting nonjusticiable political questions, and in dismissing the plaintiffs'
racial discrimination claim under the act of state doctrine."78 The litigation was brought
pursuant to the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA)79 by current and former PNG residents,
who claimed that Rio Tinto, with government assistance, "committed various egregious
violations ofjus cogens norms and customary international law including racial discrimina-
tion, environmental devastation, war crimes and crimes against humanity." 80 The viola-
tions of environmental law were based on alleged violations of the environmental
protection provisions of UNCLOS.
Largely on the basis of a Statement of Interest submitted by the U.S. State Department,
the district court dismissed the plaintiffs' claims on the basis of the political question doc-
trine.81 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit gave the Statement of Interest "serious weight," but
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 745, 782-85 (2006). In addition, the United States has in the past navigated
the Northwest Passage using a reinforced oil tanker in 1969 and an icebreaker in 1985-both times without
Canadian consent. Doug Struck, Dispute Over NW Passage Revived, WASH. PosT, Nov. 6, 2006, at AIS.
74. Nathan VanderKlippe, Nortbwest Passage Ice-Free Researchers Find: An Open Passage Spells Problems For
Canadian Sovereignty, VANCOUVER SUN, Oct. 27, 2006, at A9.
75. International straits are governed by UNCLOS arts. 37-44.
76. See Struck, supra note 66.
77. CBC News, Canada's Military-Arctic Sovereignty: Drawing a Line in the Water (Feb. 9, 2006), available
at http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/cdnmilitary/arctic.html.
78. Sarai v. Rio Tinto PLC, 456 F.3d 1069, 1074 (9th Cir. 2006).
79. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2007).
80. Sarai, 456 F.3d at 1074.
81. Sarai v. Rio Tinto PLC, 221 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1208-09 (C.D. Cal. 2002), rev'd456 F.3d 1069 (9thCir.
2006).
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declined to find that the plaintiffs' claims presented nonjusticiable political questions.8 2
Like the district court below, the court found that the alleged war crimes, violations of the
laws of war, racial discrimination, and UNCLOS violations all violated "'specific, univer-
sal and obligatory norm[s] of international la w' that properly form the basis for ATCA
claims." 8 3 Interestingly, the court noted that ratification of UNCLOS "by at least 149
nations ...is sufficient for it to codify customary law that can provide the basis of an
ACTA claim."84 However, even though UNCLOS codifies norms of international law, "it
is not yet clear whether 'the international community recognizes the norm[s] as one[s]
from which no derogation is permitted."'"5 Because the UNCLOS violations could not,
therefore, be described as violations of jus cogens norms, the court found that "the UN-
CLOS provisions at issue do not yet have a status that would prevent PNG's acts from
simultaneously constituting official sovereign acts."86 On that basis, the Ninth Circuit
vacated the district court's decision on the UNCLOS claims and remanded them for re-
consideration in light of the court's reappraisal of the Statement of Interest.
Rio Tinto is likely more significant .for the court's finding that, owing to the "lack of
clear direction from Congress," the ATCA does require claimants to exhaust their reme-
dies before seeking relief in federal court.8 7 Nonetheless, the case bears mention here for
the proposition that UNCLOS may provide the basis for future ATCA suits.
B. R.M.S. TITANIC, INC. V. THE WRECKED & ABANDONED VESSEL
In a notable case regarding the law of salvage, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit in R.M.S. Titanic, Inc. v. The Wrecked & Abandoned Vessel gave explicit recognition
to "the appropriateness of applying maritime salvage law to historic wrecks such as the
Titanic."88 The case arose out of the long-standing role that R.M.S. Titanic, Inc. (RMST)
has played in the preservation of the site of the Titanic wreck and its retrieval of numerous
artifacts for safe-keeping in the public interest. With court approval, RMST has, over
many years, acted as the exclusive salvor-in-possession of the wreck. In a motion filed in
2004, RMST sought an order from the district court awarding it, "title to all the arti-
facts... which are subject of this action pursuant to the law offinds... or, in the alternative,
a salvage award in the amount of $225 million."89 In response, the district court (1) re-
fused to grant comity to a French administrative decision that had awarded title to arti-
facts recovered prior to 1993 to RMST, and (2) rejected RMST's claim that it should be
awarded title to artifacts recovered since 1993 pursuant to the law of finds. The Fourth
Circuit vacated the district court's decision with respect to the pre-1993 artifacts because
the district court lacked in rem jurisdiction over those artifacts, but it affirmed the district
court's rejection of the application of the law of finds to the Titanic wreck.90
82. Sarai, 456 F.3d at 1081.
83. Id. at 1078.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 1085-86 (quoting Siderrnan de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 715 (9th Cir. 1992)).
86. Id.
87. Sarai, 456 F.3d at 1099.
88. R.M.S. Titanic, Inc. v. Wrecked & Abandoned Vessel, 435 F.3d 521, 524 (4th Cir. 2006).
89. Id. at 524.
90. Id.
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At the outset, the Court of Appeals noted that "[t]he law of salvage, which has been
applied to this case until now, has a favored, indeed a dignified, place within the law of
nations or the jus gentium. The law of finds, however, is a disfavored common-law doc-
trine rarely applied to wrecks and then only under limited circumstances." 91 In particular,
the court noted, "the law of salvage gives potential salvors incentives to render voluntary
and effective aid to people and property in distress at sea" by promising some form of
remuneration. 92 Specifically, "the law gives salvors a maritime lien on the salved prop-
erty," although title remained vested with the true owner.93 Where no owner appears and
the cost of salvage exceeds the value of the recovery, the court may order a salvage award
to the salvor. In contrast, "[t]he law of finds expresses the acquisitive principle of 'finders,
keepers'-namely, that the first finder obtains tide over unowned property that it has
reduced to its possession." 94 Courts traditionally have not viewed property lost at sea as
abandoned, and the application of salvage law to modern-day wrecks and ships in dis-
tress-where a title holder is more likely to exist-is generally accepted.
In R.M.S. Titanic, however, the Fourth Circuit seized the opportunity to definitively
extend the application of salvage law to historic wrecks. As the court noted, "RMST has
pursued this case from the beginning as a salvor-in-possession to preserve the property
either for the owners or for the historic and cultural interest of the public." 95 The court
first decided that "a salvor, who has accepted the role of salvor-in-possession and obtained
benefits under that role .. .may not then seek to convert its role to finder in order to
obtain title to the artifacts under the law of finds while remaining salvor-in-possession as
to the wreck site." 96 As a broader matter of policy, however, the court continued to find
that
"[b]ecause the traditional law of salvage ... involves the creation of a trust relation-
ship between salvor and the court on behalf of the owner, it is not a major step to
apply the same principles to historic wreck, creating a trust relationship between the
salvor and the court on behalf of the public interest." 97
The court further noted that its decision did not create new law, such as a new cause of
action or a new category of salvor; indeed, the law of salvage had long been applied to
certain wrecks of historical or cultural significance, albeit with some unease. For that
reason, the court explicitly acknowledged "the application of salvage law to historic
wrecks-an application that has been ongoing now for years-for the purpose of formaliz-
ing the salvage trust of historic wrecks and better informing the appropriate participation
in such a trust."98 Finders keepers beware.
91. Id. at 531.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 532.
95. Id. at 534.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 536.
98. Id. at 538.
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